Carson J. Tucker (P62209) | 3365 Riverbend Drive | Ann Arbor, MI 48105 | 734-218-3605

The Court of Appeals interpretation of MCL 500.3114(5)(a)
renders almost any “vehicle” on the highway a potential “causal link” in the connective chain of events that may then lead to the bodily injuries suffered by a motorcyclist. To assert the police vehicle that gives chase to a fleeing motorist whose car then strikes a motorcyclist was “involved” in the accident where the police vehicle was nowhere near the scene is to extend the plain and unambiguous language of this provision well beyond interpretive recognition. While the No-Fault Act does requires contribution among insurers under MCL 500.3114(5), the
language of this specific provision does not support such an expansion in scope as was applied by the Court of Appeals in the case sub judice. The causation theory espoused by the Turner Court is unsustainable not only under the plain language of the statutory provisions at issue in this case, but too as a means of imposing contribution liability on motor vehicles that have only the most tenuous causal connection to the ultimate damages caused to the injured motorcyclist. The liability imposed by applying Turner extends beyond any reasonable boundaries of anticipated and therefore insurable risk. Moreover, it is especially burdensome on governmental entities because they must engage in the performance of their duties despite the ordinary and extraordinary risks associated with the day-to-day functioning of government.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 19, 2015 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.