|Case Forum:||Michigan Supreme Court|
|Keywords:||highway immunity, highway defects, Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA)|
Carson Tucker | Lacey & Jones LLP | 600 S Adams Rd, Suite 300 |
1. Macomb County, Department of Roads
In the GTLA, the Legislature provided its own internalized definition of “highway”. “Highway” as used in MCL 691.140(1)(e) and MCL 691.1402(1) is further defined by the Michigan Supreme Court’s significant jurisprudence as the traveled portion of the roadway, paved or unpaved, actually designed for public, vehicular travel. Given the narrow interpretation mandated for statutes waiving the govennnent’s suit immunity and the broad grant of immunity, and the fact that the defmition of “highway” provided by the Legislature suffers from “no apparent ambiguity”, resort to speculation about what should or should not be included as “part” of a highway is prohibited. Any road crew would have prior notice of the types of defect alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. They exist in many locations outside the traveled portions of highways over which
On January 16, 2014, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the December 20, 2012 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is proper when a claim is barred by immunity granted by law. To survive such a motion, the plaintiff must allege facts justifying the application of an exception to governmental immunity. Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 163 (1992). In reviewing the motion, a court must review all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict them. Sewell v Southfield Public Schools, 456 Mich 670, 674 (1998); MCR 2.116(G)(5). On remand, the Court of Appeals shall consider: (1) what standard a court should apply in determining as a matter of law whether a portion of highway was “designed for vehicular travel,” as used in MCL 691.1402(1); and (2) whether the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to create a genuine issue of material fact under this standard.
|MSC requested LDF amicus brief?||No|
In July 2011, Yono drove with her daughter to Suttons Bay, Michigan to shop. Yono parked in a parallel parking spot along M-22, which is otherwise known as St. Joseph Street